Introduction
The effects of government-mandated severance payments on equilibrium allocations and welfare is a topic of keen interest in macro and labor economics.
1 Two approaches dominate the literature. In the first one, bargaining between firms and workers plays a key role. The insight is that, in tune with Lazear [1988 Lazear [ , 1990 's bonding critique, the outcomes of the bargaining process determine whether or not severance payments have any effect on equilibrium allocations. 2 Most papers in this vein of the literature, however, assume risk-neutral preferences, making it hard to rely on welfare considerations to explain why severance payments should be introduced in the first place. In the other approach, agents are risk averse and severance payments have non-trivial welfare implications. A strand of the literature following this approach, and which we discuss below, proceeds using incomplete market models. Meanwhile, due to the complexity of this class of model, this research typically rules out worker-firm bargaining. As a result, not much is known about the equilibrium and welfare effects of severance payments when workers care about consumption smoothing and bargain with firms. This paper contributes to filling this gap in the literature. We revisit the classic question of how severance payments affect equilibrium labor market allocations and workers' welfare, using a model that combines the strengths of the two approaches described above.
We bring together mainly three ingredients to study the effects of severance payments. First, we use the search-matching model with incomplete markets developed by Krusell et al. [2010] , in which we introduce endogenous job separations as in Bils et al. [2011] . Our motivation for adding this feature is that one of the purposes of severance payments is to improve job security, by deterring firms from laying off workers. Second, we consider two-tier employment relationships between firms and workers along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides [1999] 's textbook model. So doing, we aim to capture the fact that severance payments affect new hires and incumbent workers differently. Third, given the strong age components of worker productivity, job separations and asset holding decisions, and their importance for understanding the effects of severance payments, we cast the model in a life-cycle setting. Our framework therefore also captures the implications of a finite working life-time on labor market trajectories (Chéron et al. [2011 (Chéron et al. [ , 2013 ). We use data moments and policies for the United States (U.S.) to inform the model and proceed with a quantitative analysis.
The main results of the paper are as follows. We emphasize that severance payments lead to a steepening of the wage profile, as the wages paid to newly-hired workers are discounted to (partially) offset future severance payments. This outcome is a reflection of Lazear [1988 Lazear [ , 1990 's bonding critique, although severance payments are not fully neutralized due to the sources of incompleteness embedded in the model. The key observation is that this tilted wage profile runs 1 Government-mandated severance payments are widespread in OECD countries (OECD [2013] ). A key distinction is that between the firing tax paid by the employer and the compensation transferred to the dismissed employee. In this paper, we focus on the transfer component of severance payments and disregard the other costs (e.g. red tape, bureaucracy) that might be involved in the dismissal procedure.
2 Lazear [1988 Lazear [ , 1990 's bonding critique states that severance payments can be undone by efficient workerfirm bargains. Agents agree to lower the entry wage by an amount compensating for the expected future transfer, leaving unchanged the cumulative wage bill and, therefore, employment decisions. The name 'bonding critique' refers to the fact that the reduction in entry wages is akin to a bond issues by the newly-hired worker.
counter to having a smooth consumption path. Consequently, severance payments deteriorate worker's welfare. In the baseline experiment, we find that introducing the severance pay rates that prevail in Southern European countries reduces lifetime consumption by more than 1 percent. We tabulate that up to three quarters of the welfare loss is driven by the wage-shifting effects of severance payments, though this figure includes wage changes coming from general equilibrium effects. In particular, faced with high government-mandated severance payments, firms open up fewer vacant jobs.
3 We find that severance payments reduce employment inflows, while at the same time they have little impact on employment outflows. We provide several analyses to complement these results. First, we show that one must take into account life-cycle factors -namely, the hump-shaped profile of worker productivity and the higher risk of job separation among young workers -in order to capture the full welfare cost of severance payments. We also find that pension benefits mitigate this cost somewhat, although they do not have a first-order impact on the quantitative results, and that the borrowing limit plays very little role in explaining these outcomes. Second, we perform a search for the joint optimal package of severance payments and unemployment insurance benefits. This exercise reveals that optimal government-mandated severance payments, even when they are designed jointly with unemployment insurance, should remain close to zero. Hence, our assessment is that severance payments do not perform well at complementing unemployment benefits to provide insurance to jobless workers. Alvarez and Veracierto [2001] . We actually delve into examining the converse of some of the assumptions made in their study. Alvarez and Veracierto use a Hopenhayn and Rogerson [1993] firm-level dynamics model (with incomplete insurance markets), whereas we consider a one-worker-one-firm setup à la Mortensen and Pissarides [1994] . Their model features a single wage level which is competitively determined, whereas wages in our economy are set through worker-firm bargains splitting the rents from employment. Alvarez and Veracierto assume that workers choose their own probability of employment by making search efforts, whereas a matching function pins down the level of frictions (congestion externality) in our economy. Besides these and other differences, Alvarez and Veracierto [2001] 's model yields the conclusion that severance payments improve welfare via their firing penalty role, by preventing workers from going unemployed too often.
Related literature. A key antecedent of this paper is
What is the main reason explaining the difference between Alvarez and Veracierto [2001] 's conclusions and ours? As pointed out by Ljungqvist [2002] , the firm-level dynamics vs. the one-worker-one-firm setup is not essential to determine the employment effects of severance payments. It is instead the rigid wage contracts of Alvarez and Veracierto's model that drive this difference.
4 These contracts lead to socially wasteful separations, which in turn opens up a role for severance payments to enhance welfare. This benefit vanishes in our model as we allow workers and firms to make efficient decisions over job separations.
Another contribution closely related to this paper is Cozzi and Fella [2016] . Their model economy resembles ours in many ways: insurance markets are incomplete, production takes place in one-worker-one-firm units and wages are set through Nash bargaining. However, Cozzi and Fella set the bargaining power of firms to zero, hence effectively giving all the match surplus to workers and shutting down the response of firms' job creation efforts. Another difference is that job separations are exogenous in Cozzi and Fella's model. But the fundamental point of departure between theirs and our analysis is that they introduce permanent earnings losses after job displacement to study severance payments (see, also, Rogerson and Schindler [2002] ). By carefully making their model reproduce those earnings losses, Cozzi and Fella [2016] show that severance payments can play a positive insurance role. This role is muted in our model since, as is well known (e.g., Davis and von Wachter [2011] ), earnings losses generated by the standard Mortensen and Pissarides [1994] model are mostly transitory.
A few other contributions in the literature study the effects of severance payments in labor markets with risk-averse workers, but without using a full-fledged model of incomplete markets. Bertola [2004] analyzes a stylized model with uninsurable income shocks, where severance payments can play a useful role by redistributing reallocation costs towards risk-neutral firms. Pissarides [2004] establishes that optimal employment contracts should include a severance pay component so as to help workers smooth consumption. Fella and Tyson [2013] provide the foundations for privately-optimal severance payments in response to government mandates. Although their model features risk-averse agents and incomplete asset markets, they rule out wealth effects to obtain tractability (they use a constant absolute risk-aversion utility function). Last, Dolado et al. [2016] discuss the political economy problem of reforming severance payments in 'dual' labor markets with risk-averse agents. Our work complements the research in these papers by offering a quantitative study of severance payments in a realistic model with labor-market frictions, incomplete insurance and savings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model economy. Section 3 proceeds with the calibration and describes some properties of the model. Section 4 contains the main results and discussion of the effects of severance payments. Section 5 provides a sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes.
The model
The model borrows from various sources: there are search-matching frictions in the labor market; job creation is endogenous; workers and firms bargain over wages and decide over match formation and job separations; there is a distinction between recent hires and incumbent workers; workers go through a life cycle that affects productivity and unemployment risk; they have access to an interest-bearing asset. The next subsection details these features.
Environment
Demographics and preferences. Time is discrete and runs forever. One side of the market is populated by overlapping generations of individuals who work, retire and die. The duration of the working life and retirement are exogenous and fixed to N w and N r periods, respectively. A retired individual who dies is replaced by a new entrant in the labor market, so that the population size remains at a constant unit level. Agents are indifferent to their offspring. In every period, they derive utility from consumption c t > 0 according to a constant relative risk-aversion function, u(.), which is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave. τ denotes an individual's age, and β is the subjective discount factor.
On the other side of the market, there is a continuum of risk-neutral, infinitely-lived firms. Firms maximize the expected value of the sum of profit streams. They use the net real interest rate r to discount the future.
Production technology.
The unit of production is a matched worker-firm pair. The flow of output that it produces is given by zf (y t , τ ). z is a parameter common across all worker-firm pairs, which encapsulates the use and cost of capital (see Section 3 and Appendix A.2). y t is idiosyncratic to the worker-firm pair and evolves stochastically over time according to a persistent Markov process. Hereafter G (.|y) denotes the transition function for y t , i.e. G (y |y) = Pr {y t+1 < y |y t = y}. Finally, since τ is the worker's age, the function f (., .) allows for an interaction between age and idiosyncratic match productivity. It is assumed, in addition, that a worker-firm pair is dissolved exogenously with a per-period probability λ τ , that is allowed to depend on the worker's age.
Labor-market frictions.
Workers and firms come together via search. The number of contacts per unit of time is given by a constant-returns-to-scale matching function m (u t , v t ), where u t is the number of unemployed people and v t is the measure of vacancies. Letting θ t = vt /ut denote labor-market tightness, the probability of a meeting is q (θ t ) = m θ −1 t , 1 for a prospective firm, and θ t q (θ t ) for a prospective worker. On meeting, the potential workerfirm pair draws a productivity level y t from the distribution G 0 (.), and the two agents decide whether to stay together or to walk away from one another. If they choose to stay together, the worker-firm pair starts producing using the technology described in a previous paragraph. Otherwise, they are returned to the pool of unmatched agents. Firms incur a per-period cost η > 0 as long as they hold a vacant position.
Government policies.
There are three government-run programs in this economy:
1. The government provides pension benefits to retired individuals. Pension benefits consist of a fixed amount s and are financed by a flat-rate tax κ s levied on labor income.
2. Newly unemployed workers are eligible to receive unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. The UI system pays a constant amount of benefits b 1 that is subject to exhaustion. After these benefits have expired, individuals move on to social assistance, meaning that they receive a lower level of benefits b 0 for an indefinite period of time. The provision of b 1 and b 0 is financed by means of a flat-rate tax on wages κ b .
3. Employed workers with a sufficiently long tenure at their job are protected by severance payments (SP) in the process of bargaining. SP consist of a pure transfer T τ from the firm to the worker, and is allowed to depend on the worker's age.
Hereafter we use an index i ∈ {0, 1} for unemployed workers to indicate whether or not they are eligible to receiving UI benefits. Likewise, for employed workers i = 1 means that they are protected by SP while i = 0 indicates otherwise. To economize on the state space, we assume that the exhaustion of UI benefits and the activation of SP are stochastic events. They are governed, respectively, by transition matrices
with i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, p u is the per-period probability of exhausting UI benefits and p e is the per-period probability of becoming eligible to receiving SP. Let us remark here that SP imply a two-tier employment system: after some period, SP shift the threat points of the firm and of the worker. The same mechanism operates in the textbook model of Mortensen and Pissarides [1999] .
5 As long as i = 0, the firm's and worker's threat points are those that prevailed when the worker was first hired. For this reason, we call entry-level decisions and entry wages those indexed by i = 0 and, by contradistinction, refer to continuation decisions and continuation wages when i = 1. Last, it is also worth pointing out that SP are assumed to be enforced only in the bargaining process. That is, SP are waived when the worker retires from the workforce or when the job is destroyed by the exogenous λ τ shock. 6 The reason is that our interest lies in the interaction between SP and shocks that can be contracted on. We nevertheless verify in Section 5 that this assumption is inconsequential for our analysis.
Other market arrangements. Workers and retirees face incomplete insurance markets. Hence they are subjected to a sequence of inter-temporal budget constraints:
x d t denotes disposable income at time t and a t is a risk-free asset that agents can save. Before retirement, agents are allowed to borrow up to an exogenous limit a ≥ 0, i.e. a t ≥ −a. After retirement, they face the constraint that a = 0.
Last, there is a mutual fund that owns all the firms in the economy. The role of the fund is to collect all profits and to pay out all SP earned by workers, so that no single firm can end up defaulting on its severance pay obligations. Garibaldi and Violante [2005] provide an insightful discussion of the equilibrium implications of severance payments in a two-tier labor market, with wage rigidities that may have a 'bite' on the outsiders' or on the insiders' wages.
6 Although retirement allows workers and firms to escape government-mandated SP in this setting, we find that the results are similar when we revoke that assumption. These results are available upon request. 7 We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to the possibility of defaulting and for suggesting using the 'mutual fund assumption' to remedy this issue.
Bellman equations
We will confine ourselves to stationary equilibria. In order to formulate workers' decision problems in recursive form, denote by R, U , W the asset values of retirement, unemployment and employment, respectively. For employers, denote by J the asset value of having a filled job. Hereafter, a prime ( ) indicates the one-period-ahead value of a variable. Since age evolves deterministically, we have τ = τ + 1.
Beginning with retired workers, their asset value solves the equation:
subject to
for every N w + 1 ≤ τ ≤ N w + N r , and where R (a, N w + N r + 1) = 0 for every a.
For unemployed workers, there are two asset values indexed by their eligibility status for UI benefits, i ∈ {0, 1}. These asset values are the solution to:
for every 1 ≤ τ ≤ N w , and where U i (a, N w + 1) = R (a, N w + 1) for every i and a.
For employed workers, the asset values depend on a and τ , on their eligibility status for SP, i ∈ {0, 1}, and on match productivity y. These asset values solve:
for every 1 ≤ τ ≤ N w , and where W i (y, a, N w + 1) = R (a, N w + 1) for every i, y and a. In equation (3) we use T τ,j as a short notation for T τ × 1 {τ < N w , j = 1}, i.e. T τ,j depends on age and eligibility status. w i (y, a, τ ) in the budget constraint denotes the worker's wage, which is determined through bargaining (details follow). Associated with equation (1) is a decision rule for asset holdings a R (a, τ ). Similarly, associated with equations (2) and (3) are sets of decisions rules for asset holdings a , τ ) , respectively. Last, we turn to the asset values of firms. There is free entry of firms, so that the asset value of holding a vacant position is always zero. For firms with a filled job matched to a worker whose eligibility status for SP is i ∈ {0, 1}, the asset values solve:
for every 1 ≤ τ ≤ N w , and where J i (y, a, N w + 1) = 0 for every i, y and a. T τ,j is, as in equation (3), a short notation for T τ × 1 {τ < N w , j = 1}, and a = a W i (y, a, τ ): the firm recognizes that the worker's next period asset decision is given by the policy function a W i (y, a, τ ).
Wage setting
Wages are set via Nash bargaining. We follow much of the literature and assume that the outside option of the worker is the asset value of receiving UI benefits, U 1 (.). We think this is relevant for several reasons. First, in standard search-matching models, UI benefits are supposed to exert a push effect on wages throughout the duration of employment, so that U 1 (.) is the relevant threat point even for incumbent workers. An empirical justification for this is that fair and unfair dismissals cannot be distinguished, but generally the burden of the proof that a dismissal was fair lies with the employer.
8 Next, consider newly-hired workers. For those receiving UI benefits, U 1 (.) is the relevant outside option on meeting an employer. For those under social assistance, one could use U 0 (.) as the initial outside option and switch it to U 1 (.) after one period of employment. 9 However there is little gain in insight from adopting this approach, and, in our view, it is far outweighed by the computational cost of adding a state variable for the first employment period. Under these assumptions, the wage schedule w i (.) indexed by i ∈ {0, 1} is given by
8 See Hagedorn et al. [2015] and the discussion therein. The authors provide a case study of unemployment insurance law in the State of California. They argue that in general a worker can bargain for a higher wage by threatening the employer to induce a firing. A worker fired for misconduct is not eligible for UI benefits, but proving misconduct is costly for the employer. In other words, the worker can effectively use the value of receiving UI benefits as her outside option.
9 We clearly abstract from details of UI eligibility in this discussion. To take one example, a common rule in many U.S. states is 'monetary eligibility': it dictates that, in order to be eligible for UI benefits, the worker must have received a minimum level of earnings in the base period, which is typically four calendar quarters prior to the start of the unemployment spell. Understanding the effects of such eligibility requirements is interesting in its own right and lies beyond the scope of our analysis.
for those not yet protected by SP, and by
thereafter for all (y, a, τ ). In equations (5) and (6), φ ∈ (0, 1) is the worker's bargaining power.
Match decision rules
Entry-level decisions are based on the comparison between the asset value of hiring a worker and the asset value of continued search. Similarly, match-continuation decisions follow from comparing the asset value of continuing employment with that of dissolving the match. Thus there are two threshold functions y 0 (a, τ ) and y 1 (a, τ ) defined by:
for all (a, τ ).
Aggregate conditions
Labor-market tightness θ, pension benefits s and the tax rate κ b are pinned down by aggregate equilibrium conditions. To write these conditions, denote by µ
) the population distribution of agents in, respectively, retirement, unemployment and employment.
Free entry. Free entry into the market implies that firms exhaust the present discounted value of job creation net of the cost of a vacancy. As vacant jobs and unemployed workers meet by the end of a model period, the free-entry condition yields:
Y and A denote the support for match productivity and asset holdings, respectively. To obtain the relevant conditional distribution on the right-hand side of the equation, µ U i (.) is scaled by the size of the pool of job seekers, which is denoted as u Nw−1 (the subscript indicates agents of age less than N w − 1 periods). Notice that we have already made use of the free-entry condition in equations (4), (5)- (6) and (7)- (8).
Balanced budget. Last, the balanced-budget conditions are:
Equation (10) gives the value of pension benefits s for a given tax rate κ s . Equation (11) pins down the UI tax rate κ b .
Equilibrium
We are in a position to define a stationary equilibrium of the model. A stationary equilibrium is a list of asset values
, a list of match entry-level and continuation rules (y 0 (a, τ ), y 1 (a, τ )), a list of wage functions (w 0 (y, a, τ ) , w 1 (y, a, τ )), a population distribution across labor market status, match productivity, assets and age
, a value of labor-market tightness θ, pension benefits s and tax rate κ b such that:
1. Optimal asset-holding decisions: given pension benefits s, the asset-holding decision a R (a, τ ) solves the inner maximization problem in equation (1); given labor-market tightness θ, tax rate κ b and the wage schedules w 0 (y, a, τ ), w 1 (y, a, τ ), the asset-holding decisions a
solve the inner maximization problem in equations (2) and (3). 2. Firms optimize: given the wage schedules w 0 (y, a, τ ), w 1 (y, a, τ ) and the asset-holding decisions of workers a
3. Optimal match entry-level and continuation decisions: given firms' asset values J 0 (y, a, τ ) and J 1 (y, a, τ ), the match-entry and the match-continuation rules y 0 (a, τ ), y 1 (a, τ ) are the solution to equations (7) and (8).
4. Two-tier Nash bargaining: given the asset values
, the wage functions w 0 (y, a, τ ), w 1 (y, a, τ ) are the solution to the maximization problem defined by equations (5) and (6).
5. Free-entry condition: given the asset value J 0 (y, a, τ ), asset-holding decisions a
6. Balanced-budget conditions: given the wage schedules w 0 (y, a, τ ), w 1 (y, a, τ ) and the population distributions µ
W 1 (y, a, τ ), pension benefits s and the tax rate κ b satisfy, respectively, equations (10) and (11).
satisfies the equilibrium stock-flow equations implied by the sets of decision rules a R (a, τ ) ,
, and by the jobfinding probability implied by labor-market tightness θ.
The stock-flow equations across the different states of the economy (condition 7 in the above definition) can be deduced from the model's description in Subsection 2.1. We complete this description by assuming that newborn agents (τ = 1) start off their lives in unemployment (U i ), without UI benefits (i = 0), and with zero asset holding (a = 0).
The numerical methodology and algorithm used to compute a stationary equilibrium of the model are presented in Appendix A.1.
Calibration
This section proceeds with the calibration of the model with no government-mandated SP (i.e. T τ = 0 for all τ ). We use U.S. data and policies to conduct this exercise.
10 In the first step of the calibration, we choose the value of several parameters using auxiliary a priori information. This includes several data moments of our own based on data from the Current Population Survey, which we describe in Appendix B. The remaining parameters are jointly calibrated in a subsequent step. Before we move on to the numerical experiments, we discuss some properties of the model with no SP.
Parameters set externally
One model period is set to be half a quarter. We interpret the working life as a 40-year period (starting at age 20) and retirement as a 15-year period. Accordingly, N w = 320 and N r = 120. The intra-period utility function is
We set the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ to 2, which is a standard value in the literature. The discount factor β is 0.9951 to target an annual rate of 4 percent. Idiosyncratic match productivity evolves according to a first-order autoregressive process:
ϕ is the unconditional mean of the process, ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the persistence and ε ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) is the innovation term. In addition, we assume that G 0 (.) = G (.|ϕ). The unconditional mean, ϕ, is normalized to 1. We use the estimates shown in Table 1 of Chang and Kim [2006] for the persistence of the stochastic process. The authors report a value of 0.781 for men and 0.724 for women in annual data. The average of these numbers is 0.752, which yields ρ = 0.752 1 /8 = 0.965
at the semi-quarterly frequency. The value of the standard deviation of shocks, σ, is set below as part of the second step of the calibration exercise. We assume complementarity between match productivity and the productivity of a worker of age τ . Following a long tradition in macro and labor economics (e.g., Hansen [1993] ), we construct an age-productivity profile by looking at the behavior of wage rates over the life cycle. Specifically, data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) strongly support a hump shape for this profile (see Appendix B). Therefore we use the functional form:
The parameter values for ξ 0 , ξ 1 , ξ 2 are those that we obtain from CPS data. Starting from 0.54 on entering the labor market, the profile ξ 0 + ξ 1 τ + ξ 2 τ 2 increases initially, passes through 1.0 after 14 years, peaks at 1.16, and then decreases to 1.07 at the end of the working life-time.
We use a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function for the computations, namely
The parameter for matching efficiency, M , is calibrated below in the next subsection. We set the elasticity of the job filling probability with respect to labor-market tightness, χ, to 0.50. As is standard (e.g. Bils et al. [2011] ), we use the same parameter value for the bargaining power of workers, φ, in the baseline calibration. CPS data analyzed in Appendix B show that the job separation rate decreases in a convex fashion over the life cycle. Accordingly, the functional form we choose for λ τ is
ς 0 , ς 1 , ς 2 are set to the values computed from the data.λ is what we refer to as the job separation scale parameter. As the name suggests,λ allows to scale, or control, the relative importance of λ τ in explaining the job separation rate. Thus, the value ofλ is set internally within the calibration (next subsection).
The remaining parameter values that we set using a priori information are κ s , p u , p e . First, for pension benefits, we take the sum of the two largest U.S. federal payroll taxes, namely the 12.4 percent tax to fund Social Security and the 2.9 percent tax to fund Medicare. Thus we set κ s to be 15.3 percent. The probability p u is set to 0.250 to make UI benefits expire after 26 weeks, in line with U.S. policies. Last, p e = 0.125 so that workers become eligible for SP on average 1 year after being hired. 11 Of course, p e plays no role in the baseline equilibrium since SP are set equal to zero.
Calibrated parameters
To set parameter values for r, a, σ, M ,λ, η, b 0 , b 1 , we use a set of calibration targets discussed in this subsection. Let us emphasize that, since the relevant model-generated moments are determined jointly, the calibrated parameters are also set jointly. First and foremost, the net real interest rate, r, deserves special comments. We pin down its 11 The value we choose for p e is mainly motivated by the fact that, in most countries with governmentmandated SP, there is an entry phase (a temporary contract, a probationary period, etc.) during which the firm incurs little to no cost in case of dismissal (OECD [2013] ). The entry phase period typically lasts between 3 months and 2 years, depending on country-specific institutional arrangements.
value by introducing a competitive rental market for capital and a Cobb-Douglas production function k α 1−α . k denotes physical capital, which depreciates at rate δ, and denotes labor inputs in efficiency units (so that = f (y, τ )). As explained in Appendix A.2, the flow profits of firms boil down to zf (y, τ ) − w i (y, a, τ ), i.e. the flow profits of the model in Section 2. z is a function of α, δ, and of the interest rate r whose value is pinned down by the equilibrium of the market for capital. For α we use a value of one third, and we set δ to 0.0125 to accord with an investment-to-output ratio of 20 percent. Given the very high computational cost of calculating the interest rate, we keep its value unchanged in the experiments of Section 4.
12
Next, we target the following data moments for a, σ, M ,λ, η, b 0 , b 1 . First, the fraction of agents with negative asset holdings is 12.5 percent, as suggested by the empirical evidence on the number of liquidity-constrained households (see Zeldes [1989] and Gorbachev [2011] ). Second and third, the long-run monthly separation rate and monthly job finding rate are, respectively, at 3.5 percent and 45 percent (Krusell et al. [2010] ). Fourth, we target a ratio of 50 percent between the number of endogenous job separation and the total number of job separations. That is, without a clear guidance from the data, we use a 50:50 split between exogenous and endogenous job separations in the baseline scenario and check the sensitivity to this choice in Section 5.
13 Fifth, the vacancy-posting cost amounts to 60 percent of the average monthly labor productivity (Hagedorn and Manovskii [2011] ). Sixth and seventh, the replacement ratio of benefits is 5 percent for social assistance and 45 percent for UI benefits, in line with U.S. policies. 
Model outcomes
The parameter values of the baseline model are given in Table 1 . Each parameter in Panel B of the table turns out to be closely related to a specific moment that our calibration procedure targets. For instance, σ is mostly related to the separation rate while M tightly controls the job finding rate.
15 As a result, we are able to match the targeted data almost exactly.
Figure 1 illustrates that the model can replicate certain life-cycle aspects of labor market outcomes. In this figure, the solid lines refer to the baseline model. The dashed and dasheddotted lines denote variants of the calibration in which we assume a flat life-cycle profile for, respectively, worker productivity and the job separation rate.
To begin with, Figure 1a shows that the productivity of workers, measured by their output on the job, increases throughout the working life. The main ingredient for this is the exogenous 12 However, whenever we consider a variant of the baseline model, we recalibrate r alongside the other parameters discussed in this subsection. As Table C1 in the appendix shows, each variant of the model has its own equilibrium value for the interest rate.
13 In the data, layoffs account for only a share of all job separations, and some job separations must be caused by exogenous reasons that cannot be impacted by SP. It is unclear, however, how one should use the data on the reason for job separation to inform the model's calibration. It is likely that the reported reason for job separation itself is endogenous to SP, since this might affect the decision of firms and workers to label the job separation a quit or a layoff (Fella and Tyson [2013] , Postel-Vinay and Turon [2014] ).
14 In the model, we measure the replacement ratio by taking the ratio between b i and the average wage. 15 The job finding probability is θq (θ). The job finding rate depends on this probability, and also on the decision for match formation y 0 (a, τ ), match productivity draws G 0 (y), the cross-sectional distributions of unemployed agents µ The parameter values for the life-cycle profiles of worker productivity, ξ 0 , ξ 1 , ξ 2 , and job separation, ς 0 , ς 1 , ς 2 , are our own estimates based on data from the Current Population Survey; see Appendix B. Panel B: The interest rate is pinned down by equilibrium on a competitive market for capital that allows firms to rent capital and use the production function k α 1−α ; the parameter α is set to 0.3334 and the depreciation rate for capital is δ = 0.0125; see Appendix A.2. Table 1 . The dashed and dashed-dotted lines denote models with, respectively, a flat profile for worker productivity (ξ 0 = 1, ξ 1 = ξ 2 = 0) and a flat profile for job separation (ς 0 = ς 1 = ς 2 = 0). Parameter values for these models are reported in Appendix C.
profile
actually hump-shaped as it decreases after age 50 ( Figure B1a in the appendix). Thus, in the model there is a selection effect towards the end of the working life, whereby only jobs with a high enough match productivity are formed or kept alive. Chéron et al. [2013] call it the 'horizon effect': match surplus depends more heavily on current match productivity when the worker gets closer to retirement. Figure 1b shows how the job separation rate changes over the working life. As can be seen, it decreases rapidly at the beginning of the working life, which is in line with the data ( Figure  B1b in the appendix) . The exogenous profile in λ τ is key for obtaining this outcome. The figure also shows that the separation rate increases sharply at the end of the working life. While this feature is absent from the empirical behavior of the employment-to-unemployment probability, it is strongly consistent with the behavior of the employment-to-nonparticipation probability; see, for instance, the numerous charts reported in Choi et al. [2015] .
Last, Figure 1c displays the life-cycle profile of wages in the baseline model and its variants. Wages evolve in a mildly hump-shaped fashion. The exogenous profile for worker productivity is most instrumental in explaining why wages are lower at the beginning of the working life. The two profiles for worker productivity and job separation then coalesce to make the average wage plateau when workers are in their mid-forties and fifties. Of course, the decrease in wages at the end of the working life is too abrupt compared to the data, which is partly explained by the fact that retirement in the model is deterministic. This also explains the blip in wages just before age 60. However, these features are not essential for the results of the paper.
Quantitative analysis
This section contains the main discussion of the effects of government-mandated severance payments on equilibrium allocations and welfare. After analyzing these effects, we also discuss the role played by unemployment insurance policy in our model economy.
Preliminaries
We aim to make connections with the key features of SP observed in countries that implement this type of policy. Typically, SP is denominated in months of wages per years of service (henceforth m.w.y.s.); see OECD [2004, 2013] and Boeri et al. [2017] . Our model does not keep track of job tenure, but we can remedy this issue by exploiting the correlation between age and job tenure. Specifically, in Appendix B we show that the linear function ω 0 + ω 1 τ , with ω 0 = 0.5081 and ω 1 = 0.0423, closely predicts average job tenure (in years) among workers of age τ .
16 Therefore we specify government-mandated SP as
16 Recall that τ = 1, . . . is measured semi-quarterly. The estimate ω 1 = 0.0423 implies that average job tenure increases by four months for each additional year of age.
w denotes the average monthly wage, so that T is effectively measured in m.w.y.s. Accordingly we refer to T as the rate of SP. Notice that since w is an equilibrium object, we must add an outer loop to iterate on this variable in the experiments that follow.
In the sequel, we draw a comparison between welfare in the steady-state equilibrium with no SP and welfare in other economies. This comparison is based on a standard compensated variation measure. Let U 0 (0, 1) denote the lifetime value of a newborn agent in the base equilibrium, and denote by U 0 (0, 1) her lifetime utility in an equilibrium with SP. The value U 0 (0, 1) + B U 0 (0, 1) + B Let us comment on two features of the experiments analyzed below. First, as mentioned in Subsection 3.2, we keep the interest rate fixed to the value computed in the equilibrium with no SP. As such, the experiments are conducted in partial equilibrium with respect to the asset market. They enable us to study how an individual fares in economies that pay the same return to the risk-free asset while implying different earnings and labor market trajectories due to SP. Second, since the complexity of the model precludes computing the transition dynamics, we only consider steady-state comparisons.
17 Observe that the welfare criterion that we use is fully justified in the context of such comparisons. Table 3 shows the effects of government-mandated SP on equilibrium allocations and welfare. The first column ('base') is the baseline economy with no SP. The other columns characterize steady-state equilibria where the rate of SP, T , is gradually increased. In the rightmost column, SP grant 1 month's wages per year of service. For workers aged 20, this amounts to 2 weeks' wages given our estimates for ω 0 and ω 1 . At the other end of the spectrum, for workers who are about to retire, SP in the rightmost column amount 14 months of wages. This is a substantial departure from the base scenario meant to represent the U.S. labor market. Indeed, according to Table 1 of Boeri et al. [2017] , 14 months' wages is the maximum compensation required for fair economic dismissals in Portugal.
Changes in severance payments
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The first remarks concern the effects of SP on wages. Table 3 indicates that SP lower the average wage. The insights of Lazear [1988 Lazear [ , 1990 's bonding critique help understand the mechanism driving this result. At the entry level, workers accept lower wages in order to be 17 What makes the computation of the transition dynamics especially difficult is the financing of governmentrun programs through payroll taxes. That is, both s and κ b are sluggish variables, which in turn implies that labor-market tightness θ cannot 'jump' to its new steady-state value after a policy change. Dolado et al. [2016] tackle this issue. They must rule out savings to keep the computational task manageable.
18 Southern European countries tend to have more stringent employment protection laws. In Greece, the maximum compensation required for fair economic dismissals is 12 months' wages. It is similarly elevated in Spain, at 12.5 months' wages. There are also very high levels of maximum compensation required for unfair dismissals, namely 36.5 months' wages in Spain and 62.9 months' wages in Portugal (Boeri et al. [2017] hired and to remain employed until they become eligible to receive SP. At the same time, the wages of incumbent workers increase as SP strengthen their bargaining position.
19 But the reduction in entry wages is so large that the wage averaged across both new/recent hires and incumbent workers decreases. We will argue below that this steepening of the wage profile is key to understand the full welfare effect of SP. From the firm's perspective, the decrease in entry wages helps reduce the costs of SP, but the adjustment is not enough to leave the expected sum of payments to the worker unchanged (details follow). The value of having a filled job decreases as the rate of SP increases, and firms then open up fewer vacant jobs as shown in Table 3 . Consequently, the job finding rate falls off. It is worth noting that, at the same time, the separation rate remains roughly constant. On the one hand, SP deter firms from dissolving the match; Alvarez and Veracierto [2001] call it the 'firing penalty' role of SP. On the other hand, SP lower the costs of job separation for workers. We find that these effects roughly compensate each other. Thus, according to our model, SP reduce aggregate employment by lowering employment inflows and have little impact on employment outflows.
The last row of Table 3 indicates that SP produce negative welfare effects. First, expected SP generate a 'dip' in the profile of labor income which, in turn, is detrimental to workers as they value consumption smoothing. Second, workers expect to have longer unemployment durations as the rate of SP increases. Third, since SP lower the average wage, pension benefits decrease and the UI benefits tax increases, meaning that agents' disposable income goes down. These forces add up to reduce workers' welfare. For instance, moving from the U.S. setting to the Portuguese one lowers lifetime consumption by 1.3 percent according to Table 3 . In our view, the main result is not the magnitude of the welfare effect but its sign, as it stands in contrast to the findings of Alvarez and Veracierto [2001] and Cozzi and Fella [2016] .
More on the wage effects of SP. We indicated earlier that while lower entry wages help firms cushion the costs of paying high SP in the future, the adjustment would have to be larger to fully offset this cost. To substantiate this claim, in Figure 2a we report average entry wages conditional on age in economies with and without SP. Figure 2b displays continuation wages for sake of completeness. As can be seen, there is a decrease in entry wages at all ages as a response to SP. 20 We perform a simple illustrative calculation to put this response in measurable perspective. Using the separation rate of the economy without SP, we tabulate for each age the present value of the expected severance pay (from the economy with SP). 21 We divide this value by 8 to compare it to Figure 2a , as entry wages are expected to be paid for 8 model periods. The results shown in Figure C1 of the appendix indicates that the 'pass-through' becomes incomplete as workers age. That is, after about age 35 the decrease in entry wages would have to be roughly 30 percent larger to offset the future cost of SP.
There is a simple reason why SP are not fully passed into entry wages. Workers have a diminishing marginal value of consumption, they save at a rate lower than their subjective discount rate and they face a borrowing constraint. This creates frictions when firms attempt to borrow from workers, through a reduction in entry wages, against their future SP.
How important is the wage effect in explaining the welfare losses caused by SP? To answer this question, we compare the asset value of newborn agents facing the wage schedules of either the base economy or the economy with high SP, while removing all other differences between the two settings. In order to achieve the latter, we can keep pension benefits, the UI benefit tax, the job finding probability, and match formation and continuation decisions fixed to their value in the base economy. Alternatively, we can choose to set these variables to their value in the economy with SP. These calculations indicate respectively that the welfare loss coming from differences in the wage schedules is -0.54 percent and -0.98 percent.
22 Compared to the number reported in the last column of Table 3 , this suggests that between 43 to 78 percent of the welfare loss is driven solely by the wage effects of SP. Notice that these figures include the 'direct' effect coming from changing the threat points of workers and firms (one could call it the 'bonding critique' effect), and the 'indirect' effect coming from changes in the aggregate equilibrium variables θ, s and κ b .
Characterizing the welfare effects. Next, we seek to characterize factors that increase or decrease the welfare effects of SP. We do so by considering four variants of the model, each of which shuts down one specific feature of the base economy. The first two variants look at the effects of removing the life-cycle components of worker productivity and job separation. The other two variants focus on factors related to precautionary savings. In all instances, we recalibrate the model to match the data moments discussed in Section 3. Parameter values and detailed results of the experiments are provided in Appendix C. Figure 3 reports the welfare effects obtained in the baseline calibration and the four alternative calibrations.
20 It seems that continuation wages do not respond to SP on Figure 2b . However, one should bear in mind that there are several forces at work. On the one hand, SP strengthen the bargaining position of workers by increasing their wealth in case of job separation. On the other hand, SP reduce the job finding rate and therefore lower the outside option of incumbent workers. Also, the comparison of average wages conditional on age is subject to compositional effects, as the cross-sectional distribution of workers across productivity and asset holdings may change once SP are introduced. 21 Denote by s r τ the separation rate at age τ , and by s r,e τ the endogenous separation rate at age τ (since only endogenous separations are followed by SP). Then the present value of expected SP is given by
is the probability that the worker becomes eligible for SP before the j-th period of employment. 22 Details about these calculations are available upon request. Table 1 . Circles, squares, diamonds and crosses denote models with, respectively, a flat profile for worker productivity (ξ 0 = 1, ξ 1 = ξ 2 = 0), a flat profile for job separation (ς 0 = ς 1 = ς 2 = 0), no pension benefits (κ s = 0) and no borrowing (a = 0). Parameter values for these models are reported in Appendix C.
As can be seen, with a flat profile for worker productivity, the welfare losses are lower and low rates of SP are even desirable. Assuming a flat profile for job separation also seems to mitigate the welfare loss of SP. One possible explanation is that, in the baseline model, younger workers receive lower wages as they are less productive and more likely to separate from the firm, and thus suffer more from the wage-shifting effects of SP. Conversely, in Figure 3 we observe larger welfare losses when removing pension benefits. In this version of the model workers have a much higher willingness to save, which this similar to the scenario considered by Alvarez and Veracierto [2001] . Yet the order of magnitude of the welfare figures remain similar to that of the baseline experiment.
23 Last, setting the borrowing limit to zero has little to no effect on the welfare losses. We also performed another experiment whereby we shut down the job tenure component of SP, i.e. we set ω 1 to 0 and set ω 0 to average job tenure. 24 We found welfare losses to be much larger under this assumption. For instance, we obtain the same welfare effect at the rate of SP of 0.63 m.w.y.s. as in the baseline experiment when the rate of SP is set to 1. This is not surprising, since a tenure-independent SP weighs more heavily on the wages of young workers at a given rate of SP. Cozzi and Fella [2016] also find that making SP increase with job tenure should be preferred over tenure-independent SP.
Unemployment insurance policy
We turn to the issue of how UI benefits interact with the welfare effects of SP. To investigate this issue, we search for the optimal bundle of b 1 and T , where optimality is defined with respect to the steady-state lifetime utility of newborn agents. We find that a replacement ratio of UI benefits at 35.3 percent and a rate of SP of 0.12 m.w.y.s. maximizes the welfare criterion. The optimal bundle, denoted as (UI * , SP * ) on Figure 4 , increases welfare by 0.087 percent.
As the figure shows, the improvement is predominantly driven by changes in the value of UI benefits and owes little to SP. In fact, we find that the optimal replacement ratio of UI benefits when SP are held fixed to 0 is 37.4 percent (it is denoted as UI * * in the legend of Figure 4 ).
Furthermore, this yields a welfare improvement of 0.068 percent, which is very close to the welfare gain brought by (UI * , SP * ). Finally, as Figure 4 indicates, agents are worse off at lower values of UI benefits, and introducing SP fails to improve welfare. Notes: Asterisks show the welfare effects of severance payments with UI benefits set to the baseline value, denoted as UI 0 . Circles denote welfare effects when UI benefits are set to the value yielding the joint-optimal package (UI * , SP * ). Squares denote welfare effects when UI benefits are set to UI * * , the value of optimal UI in the model with no severance pay. Diamonds denote welfare effects when UI benefits are half the value of UI 0 .
In our view, Figure 4 suggests that SP perform poorly in complementing UI benefits to provide assistance to the unemployed. This result is reminiscent of the findings of Alvarez and Veracierto [2001] , that the 'insurance role' of SP is negative. Our analysis does not rule out, however, that there might be other complementarities between SP and UI such as, e.g., using SP to finance the provision of UI benefits through experience rating.
Discussion
We find that SP deteriorate welfare directly through their impact on wages, and indirectly through general equilibrium effects such as lower pension benefits, higher taxes and reduced job creation. The latter arises in part because SP are not fully internalized by wages.
We think it is useful, at this point, to overview the literature on the wage effects of SP. In an early investigation, Friesen [1996] exploits provincial differences in Canada to estimate the wage effect of mandatory notice and severance pay laws. She finds that starting wages decrease in response to costs that will be incurred once the worker becomes protected by severance pay laws.
25 Kugler [2005] uses household survey data to examine a reform of severance payments savings accounts that took place in Colombia in 1990. She estimates that firms manage to shift up to 80 percent of their contributions into SP accounts towards workers through lower wages.
Martins [2009] studies a reform that occurred in Portugal in 1989, whereby firing procedures were made easier (reduction in firing costs), but more so for smaller firms (those employing 20 or fewer workers) than for larger firms. He finds that the wage growth rate fell relatively more in small firms, which suggests that employers in those firms gained more bargaining power. Leonardi and Pica [2013] study the wage effects of a 1990 reform that increased firing costs for firms below 15 employees in Italy. They uncover a significant reduction of wages in smaller firms, and find that it is concentrated on newly-hired workers as opposed to incumbent workers. Cervini-Plá et al. [2014] analyze a reduction of firing costs and payroll taxes targeted at temporary workers in Spain in 1997. They find that the reform increased the wages of workers, especially those of new entrants. They estimate that for incumbent workers only 10% of the wage change can be attributed to the reform, whereas 50% of the wage increase for newly-hired workers comes from lower dismissal costs. There is a literature, complementary to the studies cited here, that analyzes the effects of SP on employment flows. In work subsequent to her 1996 paper, Friesen [2005] reports that severance pay laws have little impact on the flows into and out of employment in Canada. In his study, Martins [2009] also assesses the impact of the reform on worker turnover rates, and finds that the effects are not statistically significant. Bauer et al. [2007] use German data on small establishments and document that dismissal costs have no discernible impact on employment turnover. Focusing on the 1990 reform of the Italian labor market previously mentioned, Kugler and Pica [2008] find that higher dismissal costs reduce worker turnover rates in small vs. large firms, but the estimated impact appears to be quantitatively small. The fact that the results in this literature often turn out insignificant suggests that most of the adjustments to SP occur through changes in wages.
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In summary, although the empirical literature does not provide straight estimates of the 25 Friesen [1996] also tabulates that the overall effect on the expected value of discounted lifetime earnings is negative for most workers. 26 We should note that the studies in this literature typically provide estimates based on a treatment group of small firms. Thus, not much is known about the effects of SP on worker flows in larger firms. It is conceivable that firm size plays a role in whether the adjustment to SP occurs through wages or through employment flows.
'pass-through' effect from SP to wages, it supports the conclusion that this effect is present in the data. The lack of significant estimates when looking at employment flows similarly points into the same direction. While we cannot ascertain whether the model overstates the wage effect, our analysis shows that its welfare implications cannot be ignored when discussing the desirability of severance payments.
Robustness checks
In this section, we examine alternative calibrations and assumption of the model. The purpose is not only to check the robustness of the results, but also to shed light on the role of certain variables. In each calibration, we follow the procedure described in Subsection 3.2 to obtain the parameters of the model, which are reported in Table C1 of the appendix. The results of the experiments studying the effects of SP are collected in Table 3 .
Workers' bargaining power. In Panel A of Table 3 , we study the role of the bargaining power of workers by setting the value of φ either to 0.25 or 0.75 (vs. 0.50 in the baseline calibration). As can be seen, with a lower bargaining power we find that SP could benefit workers, although the welfare figures eventually decrease as we keep increasing the rate of SP. Conversely, a larger value for workers' bargaining power amplifies the welfare losses of SP. These results confirm that the wage-shifting effect is key in making SP improve or deteriorate welfare. For instance, as can be seen by looking at the behavior of the average wage, the impact of SP on wages is substantially mitigated when the bargaining power of workers is lower. One can rationalize these findings as follows. Stricter employment protection creates the classical holdup problem between firms and workers, and increasing workers' bargaining power exacerbates this issue. This leads to larger reductions in entry wages when workers' bargaining power is high, and hence more negative welfare consequences.
Exogenous vs. endogenous separation.
We check the importance of the 'scope' of SP, by changing the relative importance of endogenous job separations. Specifically, the calibration in Panel B1 of Table 3 implies that endogenous separations make up 25 percent of all job separations, while in Panel B2 the corresponding figure is 75 percent (vs. 50 percent in the baseline calibration). The results turn out to be remarkably robust to those changes. To understand this, notice that when we change the scope of SP, we must also change the exogenous risk of unemployment,λ, to match the target for job separation. According to Panel B of Table  3 , these forces -a larger impact of SP on wages vs. a higher exogenous risk of unemployment -roughly balance each other out. Thus, the uncertainty with respect to the share of job separations that might be impacted by SP (see Footnote 13) does not seem to drive our results.
Other robustness checks.
In Subsection 4.2, we discussed the welfare implications of SP in several variants of the model that focused on aspects related to the life cycle or to precautionary savings. The effects of SP on equilibrium allocations and wages (in addition to the welfare effects) in these experiments are reported in Table C2 of the appendix. They are consistent with the results of the baseline experiment. We also studied how these variants perform when workers' bargaining power φ is switched to lower or higher values, or when we changeλ to target a different share of endogenous job separations. The results were broadly in line with those analyzed in Subsection 4.2. Last, we investigated the effects of making SP apply to exogenous job separations (in addition to endogenous separations). The results were not substantially different under this alternative assumption.
Conclusion
We provide a novel assessment of the effects of government-mandated severance payments, using a rich life-cycle model with search-matching frictions in the labor market, risk-averse agents and imperfect insurance against idiosyncratic shocks. In the model, entry wages fall off when severance payments are introduced. This response does not fully prevent severance payments from affecting equilibrium allocations, and it has a first-order negative impact on workers' welfare. These findings confirm and substantiate quantitatively Lazear's observation : "So long as there are no constraints on borrowing and lending, all is well. But any inability or apprehension by workers on this score causes some serious problems" (Lazear [1990, p.702] ). Further, the results complement the works of Alvarez and Veracierto [2001] and Cozzi and Fella [2016] . In these two papers, the provision of severance payments enhances welfare through its firing penalty role or through its insurance role. Instead, we highlight some adverse consequences of severance payments, by using a model with wage bargains between workers and firms, and where both parties have strictly positive bargaining power and choose whether to severe the employment relationship.
The model that we develop in this paper is very rich and, as such, it opens up many possibilities for future work. In our view, the more promising avenue is to use the model to discuss specific issues regarding the design of unemployment insurance benefits and severance payments. In particular, a key question is whether and how these programs should depend on workers' age. Hairault et al. [2012] show that the replacement ratio of unemployment benefits should decrease for the soon-to-be-retired unemployed workers because of moral hazard. Michelacci and Ruffo [2015] also find that unemployment benefits should decrease with age, arguing that these benefits are more valuable to young workers who have little savings. Chéron et al. [2011] analyze that employment protection should be hump-shaped with respect to workers' age to satisfy an efficient job creation condition. It would be very interesting to revisit these questions -in isolation, and also by addressing the issue of the joint design of unemployment benefits and severance payments -through the lens of our model.
Appendices
A Model appendix
This appendix contains two subsections. Subsection A.1 lays out our numerical methodology to compute a stationary equilibrium of the model. Subsection A.2 explains how we proceed in order to calibrate the interest rate.
A.1 Numerical algorithm 27
We discretize the asset space and the interval for idiosyncratic match productivity as follows:
• We work with two sets of grid points for assets. The first grid is used for value functions; this grid has 65 points and is more dense in the lower part of the asset space where there is more curvature in the policy functions. The other grid is for the population distribution; it covers the asset space with 751 evenly-spaced points.
• For match productivity, we also use a smaller grid (27 points) for value functions and a larger grid (51 points) for the population distribution. Both grids are evenly spaced over
We approximate the transition function for match productivity using Tauchen [1986] 's method.
The steps of the solution algorithm are as follows:
1. Guess the pension benefit s 0 .
2. Solve for R (a, τ ) and a R (a, τ ) recursively starting from τ = N w + N r .
3. Guess the tax rate κ 0 b .
4. Guess the labor-market tightness θ 0 . , τ ) , for w 0 (y, a, τ ), w 1 (y, a, τ ), and for y 0 (a, τ ), y 1 (a, τ ) recursively from τ = N w . The solution is as follows:
Solve for
Given the values J 0 (y, a, τ + 1), J 1 (y, a, τ + 1), compute the reservation wage of the firm for every (y, a) and i ∈ {0, 1}. Call it w i (y, a, τ ). Given the values U 0 (a, τ + 1), U 1 (a, τ + 1), W 0 (y, a, τ + 1), W 1 (y, a, τ + 1), and the outside option U 1 (a, τ ), compute the reservation wage of the worker. Call it w i (y, a, τ ). Both w i (y, a, τ ) and 27 The reason we provide an algorithm is that the solution method is actually different from Krusell et al. [2010] and Bils et al. [2011] . In these two papers, the wage schedule is the solution to a functional fixed-point problem because the wage is included in the continuation values of the firm and of the worker. The deterministic life cycle in our model removes this feature. Instead, when we solve for the wage in step 5 of the algorithm, the solution requires the reservation wages of the two agents. Reservation wages are in closed-form solution when τ = N w , and are obtained by solving fixed-point problems when τ < N w . w i (y, a, τ ) are the solution to fixed-point problems: a guess on the reservation wage yields an asset-holding decision that affects the continuation value and, thereby, changes the reservation wage. These problems can be solved by iterations.
(w i (y, a, τ ) + w i (y, a, τ )). Otherwise, solve for the Nash-bargained wage w i (y, a, τ ) using the first-order condition:
We use a bisection method to solve this equation. For
, we use interpolation and a golden-section search method. Note that at this stage, we have obtained W 0 (y, a, τ ),
6. Recover the location of asset decisions a
W 1 (y, a, τ ) and decision thresholdsȳ 0 (a, τ ),ȳ 1 (a, τ ) over the large grids for assets and match productivity.
7. Check whether the initial θ 0 is consistent with the free-entry condition, by computing
If necessary, update θ 0 using θ 1 and go back to step 4.
8. Check whether the tax rate κ 0 b balances the government budget, by computing
.
If necessary, update κ 0 b using κ 1 b and go back to step 3.
9. Check whether the pension benefit s 0 balances the government budget, by computing
If necessary, update s 0 using s 1 and go back to step 1. Otherwise, we are done.
In step 5 when T τ > 0, knowledge of U 1 (a, τ ) above the upper limit of the asset grid is required. In practice, we find that regressing U 1 (., τ ) against a second-order polynomial of a based on the last upper grid points yields a R-square indistinguishable from 1 to at least 4 decimal places. Thus, the OLS coefficients deliver an accurate approximation of U 1 (a + T τ , τ ).
A.2 The interest rate
To endogenize the interest rate, we nest the model presented in Section 2 into a more general model with a rental market for capital. Specifically, we assume that firms use both capital and labor inputs to produce, and that the production function is k α 1−α . Capital depreciates at rate δ. The Bellman equation for firms' asset values in this setting becomes:
The first order condition for capital is
Notice that the ratio between capital and labor efficiency units, k * (y,τ ) /f(y,τ), is constant across firms. Plugging k * (y, τ ) back into equation (12), the flow profits are zf (y, τ ) − w i (y, a, τ ) with
Equation (12) therefore boils down to equation (4) of the model. Assuming that the rental market for capital is perfectly competitive, we can solve for the equilibrium interest rate, r * To do so, denote by k the aggregate capital stock and by a the aggregate stock of assets. Let d denote equilibrium dividends, which are given by
The equilibrium interest rate solves: k + d r * = a. In the computations, we set the curvature parameter α to 0.3334. We use δ = 0.0125 for the semi-quarterly depreciation rate, which gives roughly an investment-to-output ratio of 0.20.
B Data appendix
We use micro-data files from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to construct the life-cycle profiles that we then feed into the model. The data come from different extracts of the CPS and cover the past 20 years:
• To measure worker productivity, we pool data from the 1995-2015 Outgoing Rotation Group samples of the CPS. As in Hansen [1993] , we define labor efficiency units as the ratio between the hourly wage rate of the worker and the average hourly wage. Our wage variable includes overtime, tips, commissions, and bonuses, is adjusted for top coding, and is measured in constant 2014 U.S. dollars.
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• We use the basic monthly CPS files from January 1995 to December 2015 to compute job separation rates. By linking respondents longitudinally over time, we observe transitions across different labor market statuses, which enable us to estimate transition probabilities conditional on age and time. We define the job separation rate as the probability to move from employment to unemployment.
• The data used to study job tenure come from the CPS supplements on Occupational Mobility and Job Tenure. These data are available in February for the years 1996, 1998 and 2000, and in January for every two years from 2002 to 2016. 29 As the name suggests, the supplements contain information on an individual's tenure at his/her current job.
Our approach to construct life-cycle profiles using these data is as follows. Let q a,t denote, for individuals of age a observed during period t, a variable that interests us, e.g. worker productivity, the separation rate or job tenure. We estimate the following regression model:
where D a (resp. D t ) is a full set of age (resp. time) dummies and υ a,t is the residual of the regression. The life-cycle profile of q refers to the coefficients ψ a on the age dummies. Figure B1 shows the life-cycle profile of worker productivity, job separation and job tenure. In each plot, the dots denote the value of the coefficients ψ a . While these profiles are already quite smooth, we find it useful to approximate them by means of parametric profiles before feeding them into the model. The parametric life-cycle profiles (denoted by a solid line in each plot of Figure B1 ) are described in Subsections 3.2 and 4.1 of the main text. Figure C1 shows the present value of expected severance payments, divided by the expected number of periods in which workers receive entry wages.
C Additional results
Panel A of Table C1 reports the calibrated parameter values used in eight variants of the baseline model. To gauge differences in equilibrium allocations between these variants and the baseline model, Panel B of Table C1 shows the value of several aggregate variables. The line shows the present value of expected severance payments at each age in the baseline experiments (with the rate of severance pay set at one month's wage per years of service). The figures are divided by the average number of model periods in which workers receive entry wages (8), so that they measure the value which is expected to be passed into entry wages; see the text in Subsection 4.2 for details. Notes: Panels A, B, C and D report results in models with, respectively, a flat profile for worker productivity (ξ 0 = 1, ξ 1 = ξ 2 = 0), a flat profile for job separation (ς 0 = ς 1 = ς 2 = 0), no pension benefits (κ s = 0) and no borrowing (a = 0). Parameter values for these models are reported in Table C1 . The rate of severance payments (SP) is expressed in months of wages per years of service (m.w.y.s.). The unemployment insurance (UI) benefit tax, the separation rate and the job finding rate are expressed in percentage points. The separation rate and the job finding rate are converted to monthly values. Welfare figures are percentage-point changes in lifetime consumption. Statistics without meaningful units of measurement are normalized to 100.0 in the base column.
